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The Pegida Movement and German Political
Culture: Is Right-Wing Populism Here to Stay?
J €ORG MICHAEL DOSTAL
Abstract
This article outlines the rise and fall of the ‘Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of
the West’ (Pegida), a right-wing populist street movement that originated in the city of Dres-
den in October 2014 and peaked in January 2015. The Pegida movement combined fear of
‘Islamisation’ with general criticism of Germany’s political class and the mainstream media.
This ambivalent and largely undeﬁned political proﬁle proved its strength in mobilising a
signiﬁcant minority of right-wing citizens in the local context of Dresden and the federal
state of Saxony, but generally failed to spill over to other parts of Germany. The social pro-
ﬁle of the Pegida movement, which included ‘ordinary citizens’ with centre-right to far-right
attitudes, points to signiﬁcant overlap between general disenchantment of the political centre
ground in Germany with the political system, as outlined in recent sociological research, and
the ability of a largely leaderless populism to mobilise in the streets.
Keywords: Dresden, German politics, middle class, milieu theory, Pegida, populism
Introduction
BETWEEN late October 2014 and mid-January
2015, political debate in Germany was
captured by the rapid emergence of a new
political movement, namely the so-called
‘Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation
of the West’ (abbreviated to Pegida in Ger-
man, with ‘A’ standing for ‘Abendland’ or
Occident in the German original). What was
most remarkable about the Pegida move-
ment was its emergence from the collabora-
tion of around a dozen citizens without any
earlier exposure to professional politics (only
three of the twelve had previous contacts
with political parties at the local level, with
one each in the Christian Democrats (CDU),
the Free Democrats (FDP) and the anti-Euro
‘Alternative for Germany’ (AfD) party). The
citizen activists all live in or close to the Ger-
man town of Dresden in the East German
state of Saxony. This federal state has, since
the 1990s, always been governed by the cen-
tre-right CDU with an absolute majority or
in coalition with the Social Democrats (SPD)
(2004–09 and since 2014) and FDP (2009–14)
in the regional parliament, which is also
located in Dresden, the state’s capital.
In order to understand the Pegida phe-
nomenon, one must ﬁrst highlight the domi-
nance of conservative politics in Saxony.
This state’s political system includes three
parties that compete with the governing
CDU on the right, namely the market-liberal
Free Democrats (FDP); the AfD, a new right-
wing political force that was founded in
2013 and has some similarities with UKIP in
Britain; and the far-right and extremist
National Democrats (NPD). Although the
FDP and the NPD lost their representation
in the regional parliament in the latest 2014
election, the overall right-wing share of the
electorate is probably higher in Saxony than
in any other German state. On the left, the
major opposition force in Saxony is Die
Linke, the Left Party, formed from a merger
of the remnants of East German socialism
and West German leftists who split from the
SPD when it moved rightward in the 2000s.
The SPD itself, currently junior partner of
the federal government in Berlin, is very
weak in Saxony.
The group of citizens that founded Pegida
was notable for criticising the Christian
Democrats and the entire political spectrum
in Germany from positions mostly associated
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with right-wing ideology—the movement
insisted on representing ‘ordinary’ people
and suggested that ‘true’ conservatism was
represented by Pegida rather than the Mer-
kel-CDU. In short, the Pegida supporters
claimed to defend the mainstream of Ger-
man culture and traditions against a liberal
elite and political establishment that was
alienated from its own people.
To the surprise of practically everyone,
Pegida founders included, the movement
quickly took off and proved able to mobi-
lise large numbers of citizens to participate
in street rallies: the number of participants
in weekly manifestations in Dresden (held
every Monday to copy the tradition of the
mass mobilisations that brought down the
East German state, the GDR, in 1989)
expanded from 350 on 20 October 2014
(the day of the ﬁrst rally) to up to 25,000
on 12 January 2015, when the movement
peaked. Soon after, the level of participa-
tion in the Dresden rallies declined nearly
as quickly as it had grown beforehand.
This rapid decline appeared to suggest that
Pegida had over-expanded, suffered from
internal contradictions and could possibly
disappear as quickly as it had come into
existence.
This article offers an analysis of the Pegida
phenomenon, suggesting that the new street-
assertive right-wing populism is likely to
remain a factor to be reckoned with in Ger-
man political culture. It is argued that the
movement itself might be transient, but that
the recent right-wing populism questions the
ability of the centre-right parties to integrate
different streams of conservatism. Moreover,
many German citizens lack conﬁdence in the
ability of the political system to secure future
prosperity and large sections of the middle
class are overwhelmed by socio-economic
and cultural change. They fear that large-
scale migration might further decrease their
prospects and social status. In this context,
the focus on ‘Islamisation’ must be read as
the symbolic expression of a larger crisis in
German politics.
Origins of the Pegida movement
According to the main founder of the Pegida
movement, 42-year-old Lutz Bachmann, the
initial reason for calls to mobilise against
‘Islamisation’ in Germany was his observa-
tion of a rally of supporters of the Kurdish
Workers’ Party (PKK)—outlawed in Germany
since 1993—in the city centre of Dresden in
early October 2014. The Kurdish activists
demanded solidarity with the citizens of
Kobane, a city in Syria then under attack
from the ‘Islamic State’ (ISIS) terrorist organ-
isation. According to Bachmann, political
rallies of outlawed foreign political organisa-
tions pointed to the danger of ‘religious
wars’ on German streets, a subject that
became one of the main mobilising themes
of Pegida.
In reaction to his observation of the Kur-
dish activists, Bachmann and a circle of his
friends associated with the local football and
party scene founded a Facebook page that
has ever since been the major mobilising
device of Pegida. From the start—and point-
ing to the background of some of the Pegida
founders, including Bachmann, in public
relations—the movement adapted as its sym-
bol a pictogram of a person dropping four
political symbols into a rubbish bin. These
included the Nazi symbol of the Swastika;
the symbol of ‘Antifascist Action’, which
was initially invented by the German Com-
munist Party in the late 1920s; and the
two contemporary symbols of ISIS and the
Kurdish PKK.1
The key dates in the rise of Pegida were
as follows: (1) a Facebook page was put up
on 11 October 2014; (2) the ﬁrst rally against
‘Islamisation’ took place in Dresden, with
350 participants, on 20 October; (3) the num-
ber of participants in the Dresden rally grew
continuously week by week to up to 25,000
participants on 12 January 2015 (some criti-
cal observers believed that the police of Sax-
ony overestimated the ﬁgures); (4) since the
beginning of December 2014, Pegida-style
rallies started to take place across Germany,
but the number of participants was generally
small—only in Munich, Suhl, Leipzig and
Dippoldiswalde did the number of partici-
pants rise above 1000, and these rallies all
ﬁzzled out quickly.
Overall, Pegida remained a Dresden and
Saxony-based phenomenon, with some
pockets of support elsewhere, but without a
German-wide support base. Moreover, coun-
ter-rallies stressing solidarity with minorities
soon took off almost everywhere, with these
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rallies clearly outnumbering the Pegida sup-
port base in practically all cities other than
Dresden.2
Pegida’s political proﬁle
In terms of political demands, the Pegida
founders initially followed a strategy of cal-
culated ambiguity. There was no list of
demands and contact with the mainstream
media was avoided, since the Pegida foun-
ders argued that the media generally lied to
the public (L€ugenpresse). Thus, Pegida sup-
porters were advised not to talk to the media.
In December 2014, a list of nineteen demands
was put forward by the steering committee
of the Dresden rallies that included the fol-
lowing: defence of the ‘Christian-Jewish cul-
ture of the Occident’; a controlled migration
policy based on a points system in line with
Swiss and Canadian examples; a much
quicker system of decision-making on politi-
cal asylum, followed by the expulsion of all
rejected asylum seekers from Germany; more
spending on the police and the introduction
of popular referenda in line with the Swiss
example.3 It was noticeable that direct criti-
cism of Islam was carefully avoided. Instead,
the rise of ‘parallel societies’ was criticised as
offending against German laws and civil
liberties. The nineteen-point, single-page pro-
gramme was clearly intended to appeal to
mainstream conservatives, and could be uti-
lised to avoid criticism of the movement as
extremist.
Looking back, the period of ambiguity
and avoidance of the media worked well in
terms of expanding the movement’s appeal.
The mainstream media overreacted to the
Pegida claim that it was lying by claiming
that this directly pointed to similar Nazi slo-
gans against the democratic media. The term
‘lying press’, a single noun in German, was
declared the ‘ugliest word of the year 2014’
by a society for the protection of the German
language. Many journalists seemed to be
personally offended by the polemical dis-
course of Pegida. This triggered, in turn,
malicious joy on the part of those who criti-
cised the mainstream media for reasons that
differed from Pegida’s, and were frequently
well founded.4
In fact, not talking to the media resulted
in the week-by-week dominance of Pegida
debates in the media, between those who
argued that one should avoid discussion
with supporters due to their lack of valid
arguments and those who stressed that the
degree of support—at least at the local level
in Dresden—pointed to the need for demo-
crats to engage with them. Politicians of all
parliamentary parties were divided concern-
ing how to react to Pegida: many local
and national politicians, including the SPD
leader and Vice Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel,
favoured engagement and visited a Dresden
rally ‘as private citizens’ to observe the
scene.
Until the end of 2014, Pegida’s ambiguity
allowed integrating all kinds of criticism of
real and imagined German problems into the
street rallies. The general tone during the
Monday rallies was much more radical than
the nineteen-point paper. Moreover, visiting
speakers raised new topics that did not fea-
ture in the nineteen points—such as criticism
of the German mainstream media regarding
‘anti-Russian’ bias in the coverage of events
in Ukraine and other issues not related to
‘Islamisation’.
Some participants in the Pegida rallies
showed wit: slogans such as ‘Putin, help us!’
were partially ironic, hinting at the rallies of
autumn 1989. At that time, East German
demonstrators had called for help from then
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in efforts to
remove the GDR leadership of Erich Hon-
ecker from power. Moreover, news items
at the end of 2014—such as the revelation
of US intelligence agencies’ spying on
the German political class—were easy to
integrate into Pegida’s anti-establishment
discourse.
Pegida’s decline and split
In January 2015, the tide started to turn
against Pegida. First, the movement aban-
doned its media boycott and the stage man-
ager and public face of the Dresden rallies,
37-year-old Kathrin Oertel, was duly invited
to appear on one of the popular German TV
talk shows. On 21 January, the main initiator
of Pegida, Lutz Bachmann, made global
headlines after the apparent publication of a
‘Hitler selﬁe’, according to a German tabloid.
The publication of the picture, soon followed
by online racist statements by Bachmann
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dating from before his role in Pegida,
appeared to prove the movement’s extrem-
ism. The story gained additional twists due
to Bachmann’s claim that the picture had
been digitally manipulated and the ‘Hitler
moustache’ added. Crucially, he was not
able to deny that the racist statements which
circulated on the internet were his, although
he insisted that he had only ‘let off steam’
and was being represented in a ‘falsiﬁed’
manner and ‘out of context’.5
The farce of the Bachmann affair—raising
questions about what should be considered
‘authentic’ in the context of rapidly moving
online media—produced a subsequent split
within Pegida’s leadership body between
Bachmann supporters and Kathrin Oertel.
The latter resigned from Pegida, stating that
the leadership had not distanced itself clearly
from more radical rallies elsewhere, such as
the so-called Legida, a Leipzig-based alliance
with a clear-cut inﬂuence of the far right.
She soon founded a new group, ‘Direct
Democracy for Europe’. However, this new
association soon ﬁzzled out after only two
poorly attended public rallies. Next, she
switched to a group named ‘193 Peace
Doves’, supposed to represent the states on
earth.
Her discourse shifted from her earlier
focus on ‘conservatism’ to new issues that
were more in tune with the anti-globalisation
movement. Subsequently, Oertel attended
various rallies that were linked with criticism
of US foreign policy, but her apparent politi-
cal turnaround—which included a public
apology to Muslims for what she referred to
as a ‘hate campaign’—did not trigger any
larger split within Pegida ranks. Instead,
Bachmann quickly made a comeback and
was re-elected by his peers as a member of
the Pegida steering group.
After Bachmann’s return, attendance at
Pegida’s Dresden rallies continued to
decline, although the Charlie Hebdo attack in
Paris produced brief upturns, as did the invi-
tation to the Dutch right-wing populist
politician Geert Wilders to attend as a guest
speaker. The so far ﬁnal political initiative of
Bachmann was to recruit Tatjana Festerling,
a former AfD party member from the West
German city of Hamburg, to put herself for-
ward as a Pegida-backed candidate in the
Dresden mayoral elections on 7 June 2015.
Her election result of around 21,000 votes, or
nearly 10 per cent, in the context of a low
turnout of only 51 per cent signiﬁed neither
success nor failure.
Before the election, opinion polls had sug-
gested that levels of support for Festerling
were much lower, which the movement
interpreted as another example of media
manipulation. Yet the candidacy also proved
that Pegida could not claim to speak for ‘the
people’, but only for a small minority. Only
about half of the inhabitants of Dresden cast
their vote, and among those, Pegida support-
ers were outnumbered by a factor of 9 to 1.
In addition, the low turnout underlined the
fact that many voters were disconnected, yet
dissatisﬁed for reasons other than those
raised by Pegida. Thus, Festerling’s decision
to withdraw her candidacy in the second
round and to support the centre-right FDP
candidate—who won the second round
against a centre-left candidate—appeared as
an effort to re-join the camp of mainstream
conservatism, rather than as a sign of
Pegida’s political strength.
It would be wrong, however, to assume
that the Pegida phenomenon has run its
course. It must be stressed that the mobilisa-
tion was clearly based on right-wing dis-
courses and Pegida leaders frequently
stressed that they located themselves to the
right of the CDU. One could perhaps go so
far to consider Pegida as a kind of prototypi-
cal v€olkisch (ethnic nationalist) movement.
Yet this alone cannot explain its initial suc-
cess, which was due to efforts to put for-
ward demands that were shared by many
ordinary citizens. This concerned criticism of
the political class for its distance from ordi-
nary people and the voicing of concern
about the ongoing refugee crisis in Germany,
which derived in turn from the break-up of
states in the Middle East and the failure of
the European Union to act on this challenge.
Yet one must also highlight that Pegida
ultimately failed to appeal to the German
public at large. Although successful in the
regional context of Dresden and some other
places, the movement never developed else-
where. In short, citizens took note of Pegida
and then moved on. There is also no evi-
dence that Pegida mobilised formerly pas-
sive milieus to engage in political activism
for the ﬁrst time. Rather, a pre-existing local
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rightist political milieu took to the streets,
but remained isolated from the mainstream.
German political culture and
Pegida
It still remains necessary to consider Pegida
supporters’ claims that they represent the
centre (the Mitte) of German society. The sec-
ond, more analytical part of this article will
therefore address the question of the extent
to which the Pegida movement points to the
receptiveness of Germany’s political centre
for right-wing populist discourses. This natu-
rally raises additional questions concerning
what is actually known about the political
centre and its relationship with other sec-
tions of society. In fact, analysis might suffer
from the very indeterminate character of
what is considered to be located ‘in the mid-
dle’. There exists an economic middle class,
usually deﬁned to include those earning
between 80 and 150 per cent of the median
income. However, political attitudes, lifestyle
and other non-economic factors must also be
considered to understand what constitutes
today’s German political centre.
On the one hand, Seymour Martin Lipset
warned of potential ‘middle-class extremism’
in pointing, among other examples, to many
middle-class Germans’ support for the his-
torical Nazi movement. This thesis has also
featured prominently in Marxist accounts
referred to by Lipset, stressing that the petty
bourgeoisie might turn to the far right dur-
ing periods of economic crisis, when their
relative privileges in comparison with the
working class are under threat.6
On the other hand, the literature on wel-
fare state capitalism has argued that the
middle class has become the backbone of a
political coalition supporting policies of
inclusive social solidarity. It is argued that
the modern welfare state remains highly
popular with the middle class and continues
to protect the centre of society against social
risks. Slightly less optimistic, yet still within
the theme of solidarity of the middle
classes, is the more recent idea that eco-
nomic restructuring and socio-economic
change have made the middle class aware
that reliance on individual effort and
resources is no longer sufﬁcient to protect
one’s social status. Faced with perceived
and real increases in socio-economic risk,
the middle class might adopt a position that
is more sympathetic with lower social lay-
ers, due to the fear that downward social
mobility might also hit them in the future.7
Thus, the remainder of this article will ﬁrst
outline what is known about the socio-
economic proﬁle of Pegida supporters,
before comparing these ﬁndings with what
is known about the centre ground of
German politics.
To begin with, social science research had
trouble catching up with the rapid emer-
gence of Pegida. The ﬁrst snapshot inquiry
into the movement, based on a very small
sample of interviewees, suggested that the
typical Pegida supporter ‘belongs to the mid-
dle class, is well-educated, employed, has a
slightly-above average after-tax income in
the context of Saxony, is 48 years old, male,
not member of a religious denomination, not
closely linked to a political party and is from
Dresden or Saxony’. The same study sug-
gested that general dissatisfaction with poli-
tics, criticism of media bias in reporting and
concern about migrants and refugees (in this
order) were the major mobilising factors.8
This ﬁrst study was quickly criticised for
possible failure to engage with more radical
participants and for overemphasising the
middle class character of the movement.
Notably, the largest group of interviewees
claimed to earn between 800 and 1500 euros
after tax, which was above average in the
context of Saxony, but below average in the
context of Germany—pointing to a rather
fragile lower middle-class position of many
Pegida supporters.
Nevertheless, subsequent studies largely
conﬁrmed the initial picture. A signiﬁcant
share of Pegida supporters claimed to belong
to the ‘centre’ on a left–right scale of political
attitudes, although the majority located
themselves on the right but not on the far
right. At the same time, it was noticeable
that Pegida supporters had above-average
education (mostly in technical ﬁelds) and a
higher than average tendency to participate
in elections. A large number of interviewees
stated to have voted AfD in the previous
election, while the expressed level of support
for the far-right NPD was not higher than
in the general population. Thus, ongoing
TH E P E G I D A MOV EM E N T A N D G E RMAN PO L I T I C A L CU L T U R E 527
© The Author 2015. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2015 The Political Quarterly, Vol. 86, No. 4
engagement with the political system—at
least in terms of electoral participation—
coexists with general lack of conﬁdence in
political institutions and the mainstream
media.9
Another study underlined that Pegida sup-
porters fell into a majority of moderate right-
ists (about two thirds), while the rest
belonged to the far right. The latter group
tended to be younger and economically less
established. In terms of party-political prefer-
ence, the AfD enjoyed most support—being
seen as not belonging to the established
party system—followed by the CDU and
NPD. A very small minority indicated sup-
port for the Left Party, while the moderate
centre-left SPD and Green parties were
practically absent from the Pegida milieu.
Crucially, more than three quarters were
disaffected from democracy as practised in
the Federal Republic of Germany, and more
than 90 per cent felt that they were not
served by existing parties and politicians.10
One must conclude, therefore, that most
Pegida supporters are not political outsiders
but have some connections with the centre
ground. However, they are very dissatisﬁed
with the centre-right parties, namely the
Merkel-led CDU.
Can the centre hold?
How, then, does the Pegida milieu relate to
the centre ground of German politics? Here,
two sociological lines of inquiry offer recent
data to locate the Pegida phenomenon in its
larger context, namely social milieu models
and a recent study about Germany’s political
centre ground that was published brieﬂy
before the Pegida rallies took off.
In the former case, the long-established
Delta and Sinus models (named after two
companies who sell their respective models
as a commercial service to facilitate con-
sumer and political marketing) divide
German society into around ten different
milieus, organised according to socio-
economic, value and attitude cleavages. Both
models share similarities with sociological
concepts of inequality in other countries,
such as the Goldthorpe class scheme in the
case of Britain, but they claim to provide a
more multi-dimensional approach that moni-
tors objective and subjective factors.
The Delta and Sinus models are also
known as ‘potato graphics’, since they both
present the different social milieus organised
in the form of overlapping circles. In the
context of the Pegida movement, one might
identify four milieus as analytically relevant.
These are, in the case of the Delta model of
2011, selected here in order of relevance: (1)
the ‘bourgeois centre’ (18 per cent, the lar-
gest milieu); (2) the ‘traditionalists’ (15 per
cent); (3) the ‘disadvantaged’ (16 per cent);
and (4) the ‘conservatives’ (4 per cent).
Although the Delta model characterises the
conservative milieu as part of the socio-
economic upper stratum of society—largely
absent from the Pegida rallies—it might still
serve as a reference point for the former
three milieus.
Looking at these four milieus by way of
the Delta description (and ignoring the other
ones as less relevant in the Pegida context),
one might identify at least a partial explana-
tion for the ‘centrist’ features of Pegida.
Namely, the ‘bourgeois centre’ favours ‘the
protection of the status quo’ and ‘aims to
advance socially and professionally’, while
fearing increased job-related demands for
ﬂexibility and mobility and potential bio-
graphical disruptions due to economic
restructuring. In the case of East Germany
and Saxony, these issues certainly form the
core of the life-biographical experience of
most Pegida supporters. Their age proﬁle is
biased towards the generation over 40,
which experienced the end of the GDR and
the full-scale economic restructuring that
followed.
In turn, the ‘traditionalist’ milieu suffers
from rapid aging and decline in signiﬁcance.
This milieu is concerned with ‘security and
social order’ and focuses mostly on the fam-
ily and its immediate environment, while
avoiding contact with new technology, life-
style and value changes. Thus, traditionalists
might be the core group of what West
German sociologists have since the 1980s
described as ‘modernisation losers’. In the
East German context of delayed transition
towards a middle class-dominated society—
in which a relative majority considered
themselves to belong to the working class
until recently—one must consider the tradi-
tionalist milieu to be still more signiﬁcant
than in West Germany. In addition, their
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worries about social change might also over-
lap with attitudes expressed by the ‘bour-
geois centre’.
As for the ‘disadvantaged’ milieu, ‘strong
fear and resentment’ and the experience of
‘low prospects for social advancement’
triggered a ‘resigned (. . .) basic attitude in
combination with a retreat towards one’s
own social milieu’. It is noticeable that the
disadvantaged milieu does not share the
demographic decline of the traditionalist
milieu. Instead, it remains fairly equally rep-
resented amongst all age groups in Germany
and is the second largest of all milieus.
Finally, the ‘conservative’ milieu is elitist
and consists mostly of the upper sections of
the bourgeoisie. This milieu aspires to
defend positions of cultural and socio-
economic leadership. Members are strongly
focused on maintaining the institution of the
family, considered to represent the principal
agent of socialisation, and defend ‘self-
responsibility’ and ‘normality’. They still
consider their own resources to be sufﬁcient
to retain social distance from the popular
strata. While this milieu is underdeveloped
in East Germany, and has been absent from
the Pegida rallies, it might still serve as a ref-
erence point for the other three milieus, nota-
bly the ‘bourgeois centre’, due to shared
attitudes regarding society’s ‘natural’ hierar-
chies.
Most signiﬁcant, and worth quoting at
length, is that the ‘bourgeois centre’ per-
ceives social problems in Germany as fol-
lows: ‘unemployment, crime, migration, real
estate prices and rent levels, rising costs in
the health service, protection of the welfare
state, neglect of schools, pressure to acquire
additional educational credentials to protect
one’s social position, concern over the inte-
gration of migrants and the perceived expan-
sion of self-contained cultural minorities in
some city quarters’. These issues result,
according to the Delta researchers, in ‘a
slowly rising diffuse frustration about social
conditions’ and the feeling that ‘one’s own
efforts to adapt are no longer rewarded’.11
In summary, concern about the future
direction of German society is very common
in the political centre ground; yet issues of
concern vary and are difﬁcult to unify for
the purposes of political mobilisation. Thus,
the Pegida milieu constitutes only one fac-
tion within the larger bourgeois centre,
which also includes progressive groups and
concerns.
In order to further conceptualise the politi-
cal attitude of Germany’s bourgeois centre,
one might also look secondly at recent focus
group research. Here, a sociological study
published directly pre-Pegida is relevant. It
covered the political views of the ‘upper’
and ‘lower’ centre (the Mitte) in three West
German cities over a number of years. The
study highlighted general dissatisfaction
with the political system in line with many
features of the subsequent Pegida discourse;
namely, interviewees considered the political
system to be ‘so corrupted and dusty that
any kind of reform effort is hopeless’. More-
over, ‘dishonesty, degeneration and lack of
transparency were considered the central
business terms of contemporary politics’. In
addition, there was distrust of the main-
stream media, held to be ‘pressured by cor-
porations in terms of advertisement revenue
and belonging to a cartel of political and
corporate interests’. The author summed up
the pessimistic and negative attitude of the
centre, suggesting that ‘a great part of
the centre is at present overwhelmed by
contingency’.12
Ultimately, the study suggested that four
ideal-types of dealing with contingency exist
in the political centre, namely: (1) those
searching for orientation to manage reality;
(2) self-conﬁdent reducers of complexity; (3)
ambitious artists of social opportunities; and
(4) histrionic idealisers of the past. Ignoring
details of this—perhaps not very convincing
—effort to describe behavioural ideal types,
the most signiﬁcant result of this qualitative
study was that three of the four types (2–4)
are characterised by more or less aggressive
hostility towards Germany’s political class.
The study also clariﬁed, with reference to
quantitative data quoted from other sources,
that this general loss of conﬁdence in the
political system has only occurred since the
1990s.13
Conclusion
What lessons can be drawn from the Pegida
case in the context of Germany’s political
culture? Four points deserve to be singled
out by way of a conclusion. First, the general
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loss of conﬁdence in the political system
(Politikverdrossenheit) has become the domi-
nant political attitude in the centre ground
of German politics. This trend should be
acknowledged as real rather than as a kind
of tactical attitude of centrist citizens to place
more pressure on the political class to
improve its performance. In this context, the
rapid decline in electoral participation in
Germany—although not concentrated in the
centre, but rather mostly amongst the disad-
vantaged groups—is alarming, as is the low
conﬁdence of the centre in its socio-economic
stability and future prospects.
Second, the centre’s distrust of the political
system is due to structural factors that have
been building up since the 1990s in the con-
text of neoliberal economic restructuring. In
particular, the decision of the then SPD and
Green party government to severely retrench
the welfare state (the so-called ‘Hartz
reforms’ after 2002) produced large-scale
demoralisation of the centre-left SPD’s elec-
toral base. This triggered in turn a perma-
nent disengagement of disadvantaged
milieus from the political system. Notably,
the SPD lost half of its electoral support after
the Hartz reforms and has never since been
able to recover. Thus, the fact that SPD sup-
porters have been largely absent from the
Pegida rallies should not be considered a
sign of strength of the centre left. On the
contrary, former SPD supporters have by
now been disengaged for so long that they
no longer show up in opinion polls.
Third, the Pegida mobilisation raises the
question to what extent ‘modernisation
losers’ on the right of the political spectrum
will permanently disengage from the centre
right. It is conceivable that the CDU will
now suffer losses among former core sup-
porters. There are certainly many issues that
could trigger a breakdown of the CDU’s
electoral coalition, such as the never-ending
euro currency crisis or the poor management
of refugee-related problems in Germany’s
complex and slow-moving federal system. In
fact, the structural decline of the SPD might
now be followed by a similar process in the
CDU milieu. This tendency is more likely to
persist since the centre right and the centre
left—currently governing Germany in a
grand coalition—are overwhelmingly con-
cerned with competing for marginal voters
in the centre while abandoning the more left-
ist and more rightist poles.
Fourth, the Pegida phenomenon of largely
leaderless right-wing populism does point to
a crisis of political representation. While Ger-
many’s party system appears more stable
than is the case in other EU countries, this is
largely due to the disengagement of large
sections of the electorate and particularly of
the disadvantaged groups. In order to make
right-wing populism electorally viable, push
and pull factors both need to be in place. In
the German context, right-wing populism
has suffered from organisational competition
between moderate rightists and a far-right
pole. In this context, the AfD party—the
most recent effort to construct a ‘moderate’
party to the right of the CDU—has recently
suffered a split between ‘national liberals’
and ‘national conservatives’. Thus, the push
factor of a right-wing populist movement in
the streets is not necessarily going to directly
spill over into the realm of parliamentary
politics. Yet the Pegida surprise has shown
that political stability in Germany should not
be taken for granted. How the existing gap
in political representation is going to be
ﬁlled is anybody’s guess.
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